The Enduring War and A Trial for NATO’s Concord

The Russo-Ukrainian war will change the geopolitical scene and a daring measure is perchance the only way out for this ride-or-die voyage. Source: Unsplash

With the War in Ukraine nearing its one-year anniversary, Russia has proven that it is still the main adversary of the western North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). While the current conflict presents several challenges to NATO, overcoming this may be the golden opportunity for NATO to solidify its unity. Also, examining how NATO responds to Russia’s aggressive behaviours is a way to observe the internal dynamics of NATO.

At the present, NATO member countries often share conflicting views on the strategy to respond to Russia. Many factors shape the different stances each member country has taken, but mainly each member state's strategic considerations and domestic situations heavily influence the stances. These differences in stances can be traced back to the 2014 Crimean annexation, with each alliance member state showing different positions despite its solidarity pledge. The sanctions imposed on Russia as a reaction to the annexation also faced strong resistance from the European countries in the alliance. The reactions stem from the horrendous economic impact those sanctions brought upon NATO European member states in 2014. Currently, facing the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the NATO alliance member states have shown unity in the face of adversity. However, this unity does not stop division from growing between member states.

In the past Pre 2022 invasion of Ukraine, most member states have different stances shaped by their strategic considerations and domestic situations. However, there are some member countries stances that are in stark contrast to the rest. It is the stances of Germany and Turkey. Germany tends to highly hold its pacifist demeanour while Turkey itself is often at odds with the rest—exacerbated by its disappointment in the USA when the allies failed to prevent the coup d'état against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2016. This dynamic gets more intricate because of the members' domestic situations, one of them being Germany’s arduous struggle to fulfil its minimum defence spending. Germany has continuously failed to spend at least 2% of its GDP, making it the country’s Achilles’ heel for NATO to excoriate. For example, despite Chancellor Olaf Scholz terming the Russian invasion of Ukraine as Zeitenwende or a turning point of Germany's foreign policy, it still drags its feet on crucial matters. Earlier this month, President Volodymyr Zelensky made a plea to NATO member countries to donate additional aid to anticipate Russia’s spring offensive. While some member countries immediately demonstrated their ardent willingness, Germany alone eschewed deciding on Leopard 2A’s dispatch extremely needed by Ukraine—fueling the allies' contentious dynamics. Only after significant political pressure from other NATO member states does Germany reverse its stances. While this change in policy contrasts with what took place during the 2014 Crimean annexation, in which Germany preferred pacifist measures towards Russia, the Russo-Ukrainian war finally shed a chance to see NATO almost collectively put forth a common interest—that is containing if not weakening Russia—over any hopeful, pacifist strategy. Indeed, an alliance and collective defence may be formed and buttressed before a common threat or adversary’s existence. However, it remains interesting how only this extreme escalation of the ongoing war can finally make NATO members a step closer to consensus.

The Russo-Ukrainian war will change the geopolitical scene and a daring measure is perchance the only way out for this ride-or-die voyage. It is a pivotal moment for NATO either to finally break free from the baleful Russian threat or to potentially see the nascency of a mightier Russia. Even so, the we-feeling strengthened by this cannot enshroud the other facets of its internal conflicts. Turkey, for instance, is another case NATO must deal with, particularly with its insouciant manner towards Russia, its obstructionist stances in response to Sweden and Finland's NATO membership bid, and a straining relationship with the allies. Should the perduring internal conflict in NATO cease through this war-born concord, NATO will also have to ponder on the next step after the war. There is a prospect that the allies will shift the focus to China. However, other issues also persist, for the sanctions and prodigal budget spent on the incumbent war will inflict prominent economic impacts on the countries, particularly during the challenging years ahead. If NATO overlooks this issue, then the internal rift among the allies will more than likely resurface after this solid period and there is no guarantee how intense the rivalry with China must be until the same concordance is reached.