Defense Procurement Decisions Virtual Conference | CRDF Global Washington, DC – January 31st, 2022
Picture: Alexandre Debiève
Moderator – Abigail Stowe-Thurston, CRDF Global
Ms. Thurston welcomed all participants of this conference. The conference was a presentation of research projects funded by CRDF Global to several researchers/research teams. Two major themes have been discussed, namely regional dynamics and transfer of technology.
SESSION ONE – Regional Dynamics
Dr. Rupal Mehta – The Challenges of Hypersonic Missiles in Crisis Bargaining
Dr. Mehta focused on how hypersonic missiles affect deterrent and conflict escalation/de-escalation in the region. Two debates are trying to be connected, namely those who see hypersonic weapons as a major threat and those who see hypersonic weapons as a significant threat but don’t significantly affect the course of the conflict.
From her research, Dr. Mehta found that hypersonic weapons encourage preventive diplomacy because of the uncertainty that arises from the weapons’ technology. To prevent many countries from developing hypersonic weapons without control, barriers to entry can be developed based on international law. Dr. Mehta concluded by stating that the threat from hypersonic weapons can still be managed.
Dr. Denik Iswardani Witari et al – Strengthening Civil-Military Relations in Preventing Illegal Weapons Circulation in Papua
Dr. Iswandari and her team found that the presence of illegal weapons exacerbated the conflict between separatist groups and the TNI in Papua. Most illegal weapons were smuggled from the border with Papua New Guinea. However, illegal weapons also came from Ambon, Jakarta, the Philippines, and Australia. The presence of illegal weapons was influenced by the acceptance of Benny Wenda into the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) forum, the inconsistency from President Joko Widodo’s strategy, and the uncertainty from Gen. Andika’s different approach.
Dr. Iswandari gave the main recommendation that strategic communication should be prioritized. The government must strengthen civil-military relations using the Penta helix elements, which involve academics, business, government, local communities, and media. Strategic communication can also provide understanding to the Papuan people that ownership of weapons can worsen conflicts or even cause collateral damages.
SESSION TWO – Technology Transfer
Dr. Andrea Viski – Malevolent Acquisition Strategies in South and Southeast Asia
Dr. Viski explained the risks of dual-use weaponry. Dual-use weaponry can be defined as a weapon – or technology – used for civilian and military use. Dual-use is already regulated in international law, but its compliance can’t be verified. This is important considering the dual-use of technologies is beneficial for actors who have predatory intentions.
To prevent conflict escalation, it takes awareness from the military as well as scientists in transferring technology. Both parties must have the awareness that some technologies are too dangerous to develop. Once the technology is developed, then it will be difficult to control.
Dr. Gaurav Tyagi et al – Guarding Against China’s Theft, Forced Transfer, and Predatory Acquisition of Technology and Companies
Dr. Tyagi and his team explained that China often steals weapons technology after purchasing it, with Russia often being the main target. This theft is carried out because China’s defense industry is not as good as other developed countries. China could steal spare parts, software, and also ‘skills’ from foreign countries.
To manage this, the agreement on technology transfer should be clarified. If the transfer is to take place, then there needs to be a clear agreement on what can be transferred and what can’t. Unauthorized technology transfers and thefts can trigger conflict and sharpen rivalry during the great power competition era.
INADIS Notes: Defense procurement always becomes a tricky issue anywhere in the world. Not only sensitive issues regarding a nation’s secret and strategy, but also high technology and budget. Thus, this dimension should be addressed cautiously, especially for developing countries that usually possessed lesser technology advancement. Indonesia as a developing country should move forward with the necessity for domestic security procurement. Furthermore, although other countries may find Indonesian necessity is a diplomatic rift, Indonesia should explain diplomatically that the defense procurements that being built nowadays are for self-defense and domestic needs without any insidious intentions toward aggression even despite the defense procurements involved high-technology. Moreover, Indonesia should possess the capability for fulfilling defense-procurement, even demanding high-technology, with locally produce technology or domestic components.